990119 1943 progressive truthfulness in Kant

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Von: B Merrill <merrillb@crisny.org>
An: Multiple recipients of list <kant-l@bucknell.edu>
Betreff: progressive truthfulness in Kant?
Datum: Dienstag, 19. Januar 1999 19:52

This topic of the conforming of objects and knowledge elicits a query which
has been puzzling me for some time: Does Kant operate with a conception of
progressive truthfulness, or getting-closer-to-the-truth? If so, how is this
articulated?

A few relevant points:

1) The thrust transcendental deduction is from subjective to objective
judgments, e.g. from "this object appears heavy" to "this object is heavy."
Subsequent to the deduction, is there a further progress towards objectivity?

2) _If_ our target is objectivity, it is not the complete objectivity of the
absolutely non-subjective thing-in-itself, which is, by definition,
altogether outside the compass of human cognition-- except as a supposition.
(Here I agree with Steven P.) So this must be an objectivity that, _to some
degree_, lies within the ambit of idealism.

3) Subsequent to the deduction, the thrust of our scientific cognition is
from "mere aggregation" to systemization, totality, and the unconditioned.
Furthermore, Kant holds that systemization provides us with a criterion of
truth. It would seem that we could triangulate from these two points to
conclude that progressive systemization is bound up with
getting-closer-to-the-truth. But does Kant?

4) Concerning systemizaton and truthfulness (& the above triangulation),
compare Nicholas Rescher.

Both comment and suggestions for reading for be appreciated.

For instance, there was a recent conference on Kant and system, wherein this
topic may have surfaced. Did it?

Bruce Merrill