990120 1056 - progressive truthfulness in Kant

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Von: Marco Bettoni <m.bettoni@fhbb.ch>
An: kant-l@bucknell.edu <kant-l@bucknell.edu>
Betreff: progressive truthfulness in Kant?
Datum: Mittwoch, 20. Januar 1999 10:56

Bruce,

you wrote:

>This topic of the conforming of objects and knowledge elicits a query which
>has been puzzling me for some time: Does Kant operate with a conception of
>progressive truthfulness, or getting-closer-to-the-truth? If so, how is
this
>articulated?

Yes, in my reading Kant operates with a kind of "progressive truthfulness"
that I would call "PROGRESSIVE VIABILITY" (deriving my conception of
"viability" from Ernst von Glasersfeld's work in knowledge theory).

In my reding of Kant, his new concept of "truth as viability" and his
conception of a "progressive truthfulness" is articulated as follows:

LOGIC OF TRUTH
==============
Kant writes in CpR that the Analytic deals with the "Logic of Truth" whereas
the Dialectic deals with the "Logic of Illusion" (B170).

From this it seems clear, that we must look for Kant's conception of truth
in the Analytic (B 89 - B349).

Dealing with this division of General Logic into Analytic and Dialectic,
Kant writes:

"Was ist Wahrheit? Die Namenerklaerung der Wahrheit, dass sie naemlich die
Uebereinstimmung der Erkenntnis mit ihrem Gegenstande sei, wird hier
geschenkt, und vorausgesetzt; man verlangt aber zu wissen, welches das
allgemeine und sichere Kriterium der Wahrheit einer jeden Erkenntnis sei."
(B 82).

"What is truth ? The nominal definiton of truth, that it is the
correspondence of knowledge with its object, is neglected here and assumed
as granted; what one would like to know instead, is which could the general
and sure criterion of the truth of any and every knowledge be." (B 82,
Norman K. Smith, adapted; ask Michael for a better translation).

CONDITIONS OF POSSIBILITY OF TRUTH
===============================
This "criterion of truth" is developed in the Analytic by devceloping a
new concept of object, of its relation to our mental products
("Vorstellungen") and of course, a new concept of mental product
("Vorstellung").

In the 'Analyitic of Concepts' Kant derives that the categories (pure
concepts of the understanding) supply the universal functions which
implement the unity of experience and are required - together with the
material delivered by sensibility - as conditions of possibility of OBJECTS
AS EXPERIENTIAL OBJECTS (experience). Hence they are also the conditions of
possibility of truth.

At this point Kant's arguments for demonstrating HIS CONCEPTION OF "objects
conform to knowing" have reached a first milestone: in the 'Analytic of
Concepts' he has shown that categories are WHAT makes objects conform to
knowing, because the object-for-me ("Objekt für mich") requires the
categories in order to be constituted; in the 'Analytic of Principles' he
will then pursue the next milestone and show HOW categories can contribute
to constitute an object (object-for-me).

CRITERION OF EMPIRICAL TRUTH
==========================
Having reached that first milstone allows now an important conclusion
concerning the problem of the validity of knowledge. Where lies the truth of
the objects of our experience (i.e. that these objects are not mistakes, not
illusions) ?

Kant's view on empirical truth is that it depends on the consequences of
the involved objects and concepts: "In any knowledge of an object ... there
is truth, in respect to consequences. The greater the number of true
consequences that follow from a given concept, the more indications are
there of its objective reality." (B 114).

This "the greater number ..." is a first clear indication of a "progressive"
view on truth.

The objective reality of concepts consists in their application to the
material delivered by sensibility (B 150-1): from this application result
experiential objects; but when are consequences of these objects and
concepts "true" ? In other words, what could be a sufficient criterion for
their empirical truth? In line with the view of an object as a consistent
and coherent unity, Kant claims that "the coherent employment of
understanding is a sufficient criterion of empirical truth" (B 679).

TRUTH AS VIABILITY
================
Hence a concept has more or less objective validity, depending on its
stronger or weaker "viability" (the higher or lower number of coherent
consequences that follow from it). This leads to the problem of what
determines this viability. With the demonstartion that categories are what
makes objects conform to knowing, its solution is simple: because categories
implement "the formal unity of experience" and "are the grounds of the
possibility of knowing any object whatsoever in experience" they necessarily
also "render possible all objective validity (truth) of empirical knowledge"
(A 125, B 126).
Thus the categories, although subjective conditions, are at the same time
objectively valid (A 125-6): they determine the viability of empirical
knowledge. Given this conclusion and in the light of Kant's view on
empirical truth as viability and coherence of mental processing, we are in a
position to formulate the following principle:

VIABILITY (TRUTH) OF KNOWLEDGE: The truth of our experiential objects (i.e.
that they are not mistakes, not illusions) is determined by the categories
and lies in their viability, that is in the coherence of consequent mental
processing.

Marco Bettoni

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