990114 2322 - KANT-L digest 1158

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Von: Michael Joseph Welters <mwelters@sfu.ca>
An: Multiple recipients of list <kant-l@bucknell.edu>
Betreff: Re: KANT-L digest 1158
Datum: Donnerstag, 14. Januar 1999 23:34

Having read the discussions on options A or option B, I am having problems
with both models. A few thoughts came to me this afternoon, which I will
elaborate here, though they may quite easily be full of holes. Let me know.

For an object to be a phenomenon (experiencable for us), it must cohere to
our intuitions, concepts, etc. But does this mean objects cohere to our
thoughts entirely? Let me use a picture frame analogy.

Let us say that we have a picture frame with a glass pane, and that for an
object to be in the phenomenonal realm, it must fit within the frame.
Everything outside of the frame is not experienceable, as it does not fit
within the frame (i.e., does not cohere to our intuitions and concepts).
This means (in terms of the analogy) that the picture must fit within
certain size limits, and must be 2-dimensional. In this respect, the
object must cohere to us. But within the frame, our perceptions must
cohere with the object. My perceptions cannot tell me that there is an
airplane in the picture when there are two kids playing with a toy.

In other words, once the object fits within our intuitions and concepts,
then our thoughts must cohere to the object.

Would this be an acceptable synthesis (excusing the roughness of the
presentation), or am I completely off the wall?

At 05:06 PM 13/01/99 -0500, you wrote:
> Bob Binkley wrote:
>
>"And if the question is whether in acquiring knowledge we one of produce
>the conformity by changing our beliefs or changing the objects, then surely
>it is a matter of changing beliefs since we are powerless to change the
>objects."
>
> I think the genius of Kant is evident from the simple fact
>that, in response to Hume's scepticism, he recognised that
>nature, in its phenomenal representation, *must* conform
>to the legislative powers of reason, and it is indeed the object
>that must *obey* and change according to the rules
>enacted by the *observer*.
>
>In a dialogue with Paul Mathias in this list on May 28, 1997
>I went into some detail to establish how and why this is the case.
>Kant's discovery, of course, does not agree with George Boole's Laws of
>Thought, which formulate our logical understanding of the nature.
>>From the results of the poll it is clear that people have a great deal of
difficulty
>to grasp the essence of Kant's Copernican thesis. The use of
>expressions such as * normal science* shows that Kant's
>view poses a Monty Hallian problem for most people. The laws of probability
>clearly determine the winning strategy for the Monty's game, and yet
>most people (even after understanding these laws) continue to bet on the
> wrong strategy, thinking that their intuition somehow would be correct.
>
>I would be very interested to see at least one example
>in the so called *normal sciences* or any other possible place which could
>validate the position A in which an *object* can defy its
>oberver and can remain what it is supposed to *be*.
>I suggest, *no* instances are possible.
>
>Best Regards
>fN

__________________________________________

Michael Joseph Welters
mwelters@sfu.ca
"The philosophers have only _interpreted_ the world, in various ways; the
point is to _change_ it." Karl Marx [1845], _Theses on Feuerbach_, XI.