990115 0019 - KANT-L digest 1158

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Von: Michael Scarpitti <MScarpit@asnt.org>
An: Multiple recipients of list <kant-l@bucknell.edu>
Betreff: RE: KANT-L digest 1158
Datum: Freitag, 15. Januar 1999 00:27

Here's some help:

Kant says that what objects may be in themselves and apart from our way
of perceiving them is and must be unknown to us. Even if we could
sharpen our perception to the highest degree possible, this would bring
us no closer to the nature of objects.

See this passage. A43

Was es f¸r eine Bewandtniss mit den Gegenst?nden an sich und abgesondert
von aller dieser Rezeptivit?t unserer Sinnlichkeit haben m^ge, bleibt
uns g?nzlich unbekannt. Wir kennen nichts, als unsere Art, sie
wahrzunehmen, die uns eigent¸mlich ist, die auch nicht notwendig jedem
Wesen, obzwar jedem Menschen, zukommen mu?. Mit dieser haben wir es
lediglich zu tun. Raum und Zeit sind die reinen Formen derselben,
Empfindung ¸berhaupt die Materie. Jene k^nnen wir allein a priori, d. i.
vor aller wirklichen Wahrnehmung erkennen, und sie hei?t darum reine
Anschauung; diese aber ist das in unserem Erkenntniss, was da macht, da?
es Erkenntniss a posteriori, d. i. empirische Anschauung hei?t. Jene
h?ngen unserer Sinnlichkeit schlechthin nothwendig an, welcher Art auch
unsere Empfindungen sein m^gen; diese k^nnen sehr verschieden sein. Wenn
wir diese unsere Anschauung auch zum h^chsten Grade der Deutlichkeit
bringen k^nnten, so w¸rden wir dadurch der Beschaffenheit der
Gegenst?nde an sich selbst nicht n?her kommen. Denn wir w¸rden auf allen
Fall doch nur unsere Art der Anschauung, d. i. unsere Sinnlichkeit
vollst?ndig erkennen, und diese immer nur unter den, dem Subjekt
urspr¸nglich anh?ngenden Bedingungen, von Raum und Zeit; was die
Gegenst?nde an sich selbst sein m^gen, w¸rde uns durch die
aufgekl?rteste Erkenntniss der Erscheinung derselben, die uns allein
gegeben ist, doch niemals bekannt werden.

Michael A Scarpitti
e-mail mscarpit@asnt.org

> ----------
> From:     Robert Binkley
> Reply To:     kant-l@bucknell.edu
> Sent:     Wednesday, January 13, 1999 12:02 AM
> To:     Multiple recipients of list
> Subject:     Re: Opinion poll B XVI: Results after 1 day
>
> I'm suprised at so many answers since I have trouble seeing the
> difference
> between the options. Surely for us to have knowledge our knowledge,
> that is
> the beliefs which make up our knowledge, and the objects these beliefs
> are
> about must be in conformity with each other.
> To ask which must conform to which is like asking whether in a
> marriage
> the wife must be married to the husband or the husband married to the
> wife.
> And if the question is whether in acquiring knowledge we one of
> produce
> the conformity by changing our beliefs or changing the objects, then
> surely
> it is a matter of changing beliefs since we are powerless to change
> the
> objects. (Think of someone trying to change the orbits of the planets
> to
> bring them into conformity with his mistaken astronomical beliefs. IF
> he
> could do it, his beliefs would become true, but ...)
>
> Bob Binkley
>
> >OPTIONS (reminder)
> >===============
> >
> >A) "alle unsere Erkenntnis muss sich nach den Gegenständen richten"
> > (all our knowledge must conform to objects)
> >
> >B) "die Gegenstände müssen sich nach unserem Erkenntnis richten"
> > (the objects must conform to our knowledge)
> >
> >
> >RESULTS at 12:00 (GMT + 1) of Jan. 12, 1999:
> >==================================
> >
> >1) dominant paradigm is A = 6
> >2) dominant paradigm is B = 2
> >3) questioning the question = 3
> >
> >
> >COMMENTS:
> >==========
> snip
>
> >Marco Bettoni
> >
> ># BASEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT
> ># FACHHOCHSCHULE BEIDER BASEL
> ># CIM-Zentrum Muttenz
> ># St. Jakobs-Strasse 84
> ># CH - 4132 Muttenz
> ># Tel: +41 61 4674 238
> ># Fax: +41 61 4674 461
> ># Email: m.bettoni@fhbb.ch
> ># Web: http://www.fhbb.ch/weknow/marco/krinai.htm
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
> ----------
> From:     Michael Joseph Welters
> Reply To:     kant-l@bucknell.edu
> Sent:     Thursday, January 14, 1999 11:22 PM
> To:     Multiple recipients of list
> Subject:     Re: KANT-L digest 1158
>
> Having read the discussions on options A or option B, I am having
> problems
> with both models. A few thoughts came to me this afternoon, which I
> will
> elaborate here, though they may quite easily be full of holes. Let me
> know.
>
> For an object to be a phenomenon (experiencable for us), it must
> cohere to
> our intuitions, concepts, etc. But does this mean objects cohere to
> our
> thoughts entirely? Let me use a picture frame analogy.
>
> Let us say that we have a picture frame with a glass pane, and that
> for an
> object to be in the phenomenonal realm, it must fit within the frame.
> Everything outside of the frame is not experienceable, as it does not
> fit
> within the frame (i.e., does not cohere to our intuitions and
> concepts).
> This means (in terms of the analogy) that the picture must fit within
> certain size limits, and must be 2-dimensional. In this respect, the
> object must cohere to us. But within the frame, our perceptions must
> cohere with the object. My perceptions cannot tell me that there is
> an
> airplane in the picture when there are two kids playing with a toy.
>
> In other words, once the object fits within our intuitions and
> concepts,
> then our thoughts must cohere to the object.
>
> Would this be an acceptable synthesis (excusing the roughness of the
> presentation), or am I completely off the wall?
>
>
>
> At 05:06 PM 13/01/99 -0500, you wrote:
> > Bob Binkley wrote:
> >
> >"And if the question is whether in acquiring knowledge we one of
> produce
> >the conformity by changing our beliefs or changing the objects, then
> surely
> >it is a matter of changing beliefs since we are powerless to change
> the
> >objects."
> >
> > I think the genius of Kant is evident from the simple fact
> >that, in response to Hume's scepticism, he recognised that
> >nature, in its phenomenal representation, *must* conform
> >to the legislative powers of reason, and it is indeed the object
> >that must *obey* and change according to the rules
> >enacted by the *observer*.
> >
> >In a dialogue with Paul Mathias in this list on May 28, 1997
> >I went into some detail to establish how and why this is the case.
> >Kant's discovery, of course, does not agree with George Boole's Laws
> of
> >Thought, which formulate our logical understanding of the nature.
> >>From the results of the poll it is clear that people have a great
> deal of
> difficulty
> >to grasp the essence of Kant's Copernican thesis. The use of
> >expressions such as * normal science* shows that Kant's
> >view poses a Monty Hallian problem for most people. The laws of
> probability
> >clearly determine the winning strategy for the Monty's game, and yet
> >most people (even after understanding these laws) continue to bet on
> the
> > wrong strategy, thinking that their intuition somehow would be
> correct.
> >
> >I would be very interested to see at least one example
> >in the so called *normal sciences* or any other possible place which
> could
> >validate the position A in which an *object* can defy its
> >oberver and can remain what it is supposed to *be*.
> >I suggest, *no* instances are possible.
> >
> >Best Regards
> >fN
>
> __________________________________________
>
> Michael Joseph Welters
> mwelters@sfu.ca
> "The philosophers have only _interpreted_ the world, in various ways;
> the
> point is to _change_ it." Karl Marx [1845], _Theses on Feuerbach_, XI.
>