990114 1257 - conforming of objects and knowledge

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Von: Stefan Heßbrüggen-Walter <waltest@uni-muenster.de>
An: Multiple recipients of list <kant-l@bucknell.edu>
Betreff: Re: conforming of objects and knowledge
Datum: Donnerstag, 14. Januar 1999 13:07

On Wed, 13 Jan 1999, B Merrill wrote:

> Isn't there a crucial
> distinction between the ground of the lawfulness inherent to the categories,
> and that supposed by particular empirical laws, gathered (or not!) into
> systematic science?
>
> Bruce Merrill

Yes, certainly. In my opinion, Kant himself noted this difference on two
different levels. Regarding the work of the understanding, one always has to
keep in mind that empirical judgments can only be true if they are
instantiated by empirical intuitions viz. sensations. This implies that the
law-giving potential of the understanding is always limited, because the
truth of empirical laws depends on the given as well as on the human mind.
Wouldn't the opposite position - only the understanding gives the laws of
nature (as is hinted at towards the end of the A-Deduction) - make Kant
an empirical idealist?
The second level concerns the dialectic. It is the regulative use of reason
and its ideas that makes our knowledge systematic. And systematicity is the
specific quality of science compared to everyday-knowledge, a point that is
very prominent in Kant's logic as well.

Best regards
Stefan Hessbrueggen