990117 0144 - conforming of objects and knowledge

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Von: Michael Scarpitti <MScarpit@asnt.org>
An: Multiple recipients of list <kant-l@bucknell.edu>
Betreff: RE: conforming of objects and knowledge
Datum: Sonntag, 17. Januar 1999 01:52

Come on, guys! This is really simple. Kant maintained that "objects" are
in space and in time: else they are not objects. We cannot escape from
our sensibility's spacio-temporality, and therefore what "objects" may
be apart from that sensibility (i.e., outside of space and time) is and
must remain unknown to us. "God" cannot be "known" if "God" is outside
space and time. We cannot, therefore, have "God" as an "object".

Michael A Scarpitti
e-mail mscarpit@asnt.org

> ----------
> From:     pmr@mindspring.com
> Reply To:     kant-l@bucknell.edu
> Sent:     Saturday, January 16, 1999 03:05 PM
> To:     Multiple recipients of list
> Subject:     conforming of objects and knowledge
>
>             This exchange may be provocative with regard to
> the conformity question
>             that is swirling about just now.
>
>             Philip wrote (with regard to HUme's Enquiry,
> section 118):
>
>             >>I am presently resting my case with regard to
> Hume on this point. He doubts
>             >>any certainty, except the certainty that his
> own movements do not affect
>             >>the objects. And that is purely synthetic and
> unwarranted and unsupportable
>             >>(in his system), and that is one of the two
> reasons that Hume is simply
>              >>wrong.
>             >
>             >
>             Philip's friend replied:
>
>             >I don't think so. I don't see how a metaphysics
> fixed this
>              >"problem". Why is it a problem. I really don't
> understand this.
>             >Why do you "need" more certainty than "it
> works".
>             >
>             >
>             >
>             Philip now comments:
>
>             Two things quickly. I agree that metaphysics
> cannot do almost nothing. Kant
>             was thoroughly one with Hume in his desire to
> rid the university of
>             metaphysics. That was the primary reason for the
> Critique of Pure Reason.
>             Only Kant did not want to toss out science as
> Hume was doing in order to
>             win the case against Metaphysics.
>
>             Secondly, the notion "it works" is very
> suggestive. It will work to think
>             of yourself in a world in which things are
> themselves exactly as they
>             appear to be, e.g., that objects around you move
> as you do, like telephone
>             poles that approach you as you approach them.
> Very simple hypothesis:
>             things are as they appear. The fact that you can
> function and get around
>             very well in a world like that (where doors are
> small at a distance, but
>             grow large enough for transition through upon
> approach) is proven by the
>             maneuvering skills of animals and also pilots in
> training cockpits
>
>             Humans (but perhaps not the animals) reject that
> hypothesis and conclude
>             that things are _not_ as they appear, but that
> they appear the way they do
>             due to our subjective make up, e.g., two eyes
> which present two pictures of
>             things which are merged in the brain. It is by
> means of the latter
>             hypothesis that we can make sense out of the
> spectral split-finger which
>             haunts our noses occasionally; although it would
> work more simply to say
>             that the finger splits and that there is only a
> contingent correlation
>             between touch and sight.
>
>             I have been looking around for some descriptive
> definition of humans, and I
>             think it is something like this: humans are
> beings who 1. figure things out
>             and 2. who resist being forced.*
>
>             [* and I almost want to add: 3. who delight in
> pattern.]
>
>             With regard to the current "conformity" question
> of this Kant forum, it
>             would seem indeed that the objects must conform
> to our way of cognizing
>             (which is a figuring out via experiments driven
> by the categories and the
>             ways of time determination); for otherwise we
> are stuck with things on
>             their own, like fingers which split in two
> without the least feeling
>             associated with that splitting.*
>
>             [* At least I have no remembrance of any feeling
> associated with the
>             splitting of the finger, although sometimes
> there is a odor. ;-) ]
>
>             Btw: it is really odd, when you think about it,
> that we do not speak in
>             this wise: our two left index fingers (let us
> say) merge into one as they
>             get further from the nose.
>
>
>
>             Philip McPherson Rudisill
>
>             The Bishop of Assisi: "But Francis, you have to
> own _something_!"
>             Francis: "If we owned anything, my lord Bishop,
> we would have to own a
>             sword to defend it!"
>             Analysis: the first property is always a weapon
> (for property entails: a
>             _right_ to keep the hands of others away from
> what it is that is
>             possessed).
>
>             Responsible for:
>              http://www.frabel.com (a commercial home page)
>             and
>              http://www.mindspring.com/~kantwesley/ (my
> personal home page)
>
>