990115 0102 - conforming of objects and knowledge

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Von: Marco Bettoni <m.bettoni@fhbb.ch>
An: Multiple recipients of list <kant-l@bucknell.edu>
Betreff: conforming of objects and knowledge
Datum: Freitag, 15. Januar 1999 01:15

Bruce,

you wrote about a "crucial distinction":

> shouldn't we distinguish between the conformation which is supposed=20
> at the point of the transcendental deduction and the projection of the =

> categories, and the conformation which takes place according to
> Kant's philosophy of science, as expounded in the appendix to the=20
> dialectic ? Isn't there a crucial distinction between the ground of =
the
> lawfulness inherent to the categories, and that supposed by particular =

> empirical laws, gathered (or not!) into systematic science ?

I certainly agree that we should understand as crucial a distinction =
between that two kinds of conformation.

As I understand Kant, he uses the terms "constitutive" and "regulative" =
to distinguish the two conformations.

1. "constitutive" conformation:=20
the pure concepts of understanding (categories) determine the object =
("bestimmen den Begenstand"); the resulting object is a constituted =
object.

2. "regulative" conformation:
the pure concepts of reason put constituted objects into a =
systematic order; the resulting object is an ideal object.

The relation between the two is that the first conformation is required =
for the second to take place ("Die Vernunft setzt die =
Verstandeserkenntnisse voraus", B 690).

Next you write:

> it strikes me that the transit from transcendental idealism to=20
> empirical realism (which you take note of) is, to an important
> degree, articulated as the distinction and transit between these
> two different conformations.

This seems to me a very important consideration, but I am not sure if I =
understand it correctly. Could you elaborate on this ?

What strikes me, is that transcendental idealism, which was "work in =
progress" (Ermanno Bencivenga), was suddently abandoned (the desert) and =
substituted by idealism, phenomenology, empirical realism or other.

I see in this shift from Kant to post-Kant the UNAWARE ELIMINATION of =
the above mentioned disitinction and its replacement with various =
modified kinds of the second conformation, like: "the pure concepts of =
reason put the INVENTED / GIVEN object into a systematic order".

This elimination was the consequence of abandoning Kant's method of =
investigation ("Zergliederung des Verstandesverm=F6gens selbst" B 90) =
for the restoration of the old method of dissecting the content of =
concepts ("Zergliederung der Begriffe ihrem Inhalte nach"): in this =
regard all post-Kantian philosophy can be considered as "pre-Kantian". =
Hegel made one of his most vehements attacks against Kant precisely in =
this point and was one of the great master of that restoration.

One reason why Kant's work in progress was abandoned seem to me what =
Kant calls "a natural and inevitable illusion" (B 354): that we "take =
the subjective necessity of a connection of our concepts ... for an =
objective necessity in the determination of things in themselves".

Another reason could be that (most) scientific work is done at the =
second level (regulative conformation), because it is only after having =
constituted the different objects of my new investigation that I can try =
to integrate them into the system of existing knowledge.

What these two reasons have in common is - as Silvio Ceccato has =
suggested - the unaware elimination (from the philosophical and =
scientific reflection) of the first conformation which is the first =
stage of any mental act: that of the mental CONSTITUTION of its =
components (objects, relations, etc.).

Marco Bettoni

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